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Abstract:   
I hypothesize that the stock market overreacts to management earnings forecasts. I find 
that negative management forecast surprises lead to a -5.9% abnormal return around 
the forecast and a 1.9% correction in the 2-month period after earnings are announced. 
Positive surprises work in the opposite direction, with a 1.9% abnormal return and a 
 -1.7% correction. The level of the stock market overreaction varies depending on 
forecast and firm characteristics, but the marginal impact remains the same: a 1% 
change in the stock market reaction around the forecast is associated with a 0.4% 
correction. These findings are consistent with the idea that investors overweight their 
recent experience in situation of increased uncertainty, leading to stock market 
overreaction. 
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1 Introduction
The stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts has been
well documented. Notably, Patell (1976) and Penman (1980) find that
management earnings forecast surprises are positively correlated with the
stock market reaction to these forecasts. Moreover, this stock market reac-
tion is asymmetric due of the timing of management forecasts, with nega-
tive surprises garnering larger reactions than positive surprises (Kothari,
Shu, and Wysocki, 2009).1 Management earnings forecasts also increase
short-term uncertainty, and this increased uncertainty only declines after
earnings are announced (Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk, 2009). How-
ever, when making judgments under uncertainty, Tversky and Kahneman
(1974) finds that a representativeness heuristic is employed, in which
probabilities are evaluated by the degree to which an object resembles a
class. Using this heuristic method, theories about the market drawn from
recent investment experience may cause overreaction (Hirshleifer, 2001).
Based on the above arguments, I hypothesize that the stock market
overreacts to management earnings forecasts. Indeed, I find that man-
agement quarterly earnings forecasts that are considered to be negative
surprises lead to an abnormal return of –5.9% on average. In the 2-month
period after actual quarterly earnings are announced, part of the original
reaction is reversed as stocks experience a positive abnormal return of
1.9%, consistent with stock market overreaction. Positive surprises work
1See Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) for a survey of this literature.
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in the opposite direction, experiencing an initial abnormal return of 1.9%
and a –1.7% reversal after the earnings announcement. While the level
of overreaction and correction are much higher prior to the enactment of
regulation Fair Disclosure in the year 2000, which prohibits management
from disclosing material information to some investors before others,
it is still present and significant thereafter. Interestingly, after the year
2000, the stock market also begins overreacting to management earnings
forecasts that are not surprises, although to a lessor extent than they do
for forecasts that are surprises.
Management forecast characteristics, such as whether to provide a
range forecast or a point forecast, whether to supply forecasts sporadically
or regularly, and whether to issue forecasts shortly or a long time before
the end of the fiscal quarter, represent important management decisions
which may affect the level of overreaction. I find the stock market overre-
acts for each of these subsamples, although there are differences in the
levels. Specifically, overreaction is greatest when managers give point
forecasts, sporadic forecasts, and forecasts late in the quarter. Firm char-
acteristics also impact the level of stock market overreaction, although
the impact is quite varied. For example, small value firms with more
analyst coverage experience more overreaction for negative surprises,
while large growth firms with less analyst coverage experience more
overreaction for positive surprises. Remarkably, while the level of stock
market overreaction varies depending on forecast and firm characteristics,
the marginal impact remains almost constant. In all twelve forecast and
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firm characteristic subsamples, a 1% increase in the stock market reac-
tion around the management earnings forecast is associated with a 0.4%
decrease in the stock market reaction after earnings are announced.
Still, Cotter, Tuna, and Wysocki (2006) provide evidence that about
60% of analysts revise their forecasts within five days of management
earnings forecast. As such, it is difficult to see analyst forecasts as being
independent of the stock market’s overreaction to management earnings
forecasts. Analysts may mitigate/exacerbate the extent of the stock market
overreaction by providing forecasts that reduce/increase the amount of
uncertainty. Debondt and Thaler (1990) presents evidence consistent
with analyst overreaction, and suggests that analyst overreaction may be
linked to investor overreaction. However, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992)
find that the extreme analyst forecasts that Debondt and Thaler (1990)
consider to overreact cannot be viewed as overreaction to earnings and
are not clearly linked to stock price overreaction. Easterwood and Nutt
(1999) settle the debate by providing evidence that analysts underreact
to negative information and they overreact to positive information. This
analyst behavior appears to be optimal not only for analysts’ careers, but
also for the brokerage firm they represent (Lim, 2001; Hong and Kubik,
2003; Jackson, 2005).
Therefore, I examine how analyst forecasting behavior in response
to management earnings forecasts affects the stock market overreaction.
For management range forecasts, negative surprises are associated with
overreaction when analysts are cautiously pessimistic or neutral, while
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positive surprises are associated with overreaction when analysts are neu-
tral or cautiously optimistic. Economically, negative surprises followed
by cautiously pessimistic analyst forecasts have an initial abnormal return
of –10.1% and a 4.4% reversal after the earnings announcement, while
positive forecasts followed by cautiously optimistic analyst forecasts have
an initial abnormal return of 2.0% and a –2.7% reversal. For management
point forecasts, negative surprises are associated with overreaction when
analysts are neutral, while positive surprises are associated with overre-
action when analysts are neutral or optimistic. Economically, negative
surprises followed by neutral analyst forecasts have an initial abnormal
return of –8.9% and a 3.3% reversal after the earnings announcement,
while positive forecasts followed by neutral analyst forecasts have an
initial abnormal return of 3.3% and a –4.8% reversal. In general, the stock
market overreaction found in this paper is present mainly when analyst
forecasts corroborate management forecasts. Overreaction is also present
when there are mixed forecasts, suggesting that analyst disagreement is
insufficient to eliminate this anomaly. In order to eliminate overreaction,
analysts must provide a signal that is clear to investors, but distinct from
management’s signal.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a
review of the related literature. The stock market reaction to management
earnings forecasts is presented in section 3, along with a subsample
analysis of these results. Section 3 also examines how analyst forecasts
can affect the stock market overreaction to management earnings forecasts.
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Conclusions are drawn in section 4.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Overreaction
Stock market overreaction gained popularity in the 80s with the work
of De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987). These authors conjecture that, “as
a consequence of investor overreaction to earnings, stock prices may tem-
porarily depart from their underlying fundamental values.” Empirically,
they show that past losers significantly outperform past winners, con-
sistent with the overreaction hypothesis.2 Subsequent work casts doubt
on and confirms the validity of Debondt and Thaler’s original work. In
particular, Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) argue that return re-
versals are due to systematic changes in equilibrium required returns, not
captured in the Debondt and Thaler papers. Zarowin (1990) argues that
the return reversals are due to size or January effects. However, Chopra,
Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) address the issues of systematic changes
in equilibrium required returns, size and the January effect, and find that
stock return reversals persist.
Other empirical papers sought to explain the drivers of stock market
overreaction. Debondt and Thaler (1990) present evidence consistent
with analyst overreaction, and suggest that analyst overreaction may be
2Empirically, a number of papers have found that returns are negatively autocorrelated over a 3-5 year
horizon in various markets (e.g. Fama and French, 1988; Poterba and Summers, 1988; Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers, 1991).
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linked to stock market overreaction. Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) re-
visit the Debondt and Thaler (1990) analyst overreaction finding. They
find that the extreme analyst forecasts that Debondt and Thaler (1990)
consider to overreact cannot be viewed as overreaction to earnings and
are not clearly linked to the stock price overreactions in De Bondt and
Thaler (1985, 1987) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992). How-
ever, a number of studies show that contrarian strategies have predictive
power because they capture systematic errors in investor expectations
about future returns and because stock markets are not fully efficient. (e.g.
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994; La Porta, 1996; La Porta, Lakon-
ishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997)
Several models have been proposed to explain the overreaction phe-
nomenon. Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) develop a model of
investor sentiment which is consistent with overreaction of stock prices to
a series of good or bad news. Hong and Stein (1999) model a market pop-
ulated by news watchers and momentum traders. If information diffuses
gradually across investors and momentum traders only implement simple
strategies, then the overall effect is for investors to overreact to stock
prices. In the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) model, over-
confident and informed investors overweight their private signal, causing
the stock price to overreact. Moreover, Ko and Huang (2007) find that the
degree of overreaction in prices is increasing in overconfidence in their
model.
More recently papers have tried to pin down the underlying reason for
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long-run return reversals. On the one hand Klein (2001) and George and
Hwang (2007) find that long-run return reversals are driven by the effect
of capital gains taxes on the utility-maximizing behavior of rational indi-
viduals. On the other hand, Chan (2003) finds that no news drives stock
market reversals, consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Cooper,
Gulen, and Schill (2008) find that asset growth may explain return rever-
sals and that their result is consistent with overreaction, however Cooper
and Priestley (2011) find that this result is driven by risk.
While most papers testing the overreaction hypothesis examine long-
run return reversals, a few papers have provided evidence of short-run
return reversals. In particular, Tetlock (2011) finds that investors overreact
to stale news in the short-run, and reversals occur within one week of the
event. Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992) also provide evidence of
short-run reversals by showing that the abnormal returns of winners and
losers for the 3-day period in which quarterly earnings announcements
occur, are reversed at the subsequent earnings announcement. Short-run
return reversals are more difficult to attribute to bad model problems since
the model misspecification is less likely to overturn the return reversal
result over a short period of time. This paper contributes to this literature
by documenting overreaction to management earnings forecast over a
relatively short horizon.
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2.2 Information Uncertainty
This paper also contributes to the growing literature on the impact of
information uncertainty on stock market returns. Jiang, Lee, and Zhang
(2005) show that high information uncertainty firms earn lower future
returns than low information uncertainty firms on average. They note that
their findings are consistent with analytical models in which high informa-
tion uncertainty exacerbates investor overconfidence and limits rational
arbitrage. Zhang (2006b) finds greater price drift when there is greater
information uncertainty, consistent with the idea that short-term price
continuation is due to investor behavioral biases. Zhang (2006a) further
finds that information uncertainty exacerbates analyst behavioral biases,
by showing that analysts have more positive (negative) forecast errors
following good (bad) news. Using implied volatilities from exchange-
traded options prices, Rogers, Skinner, and Van Buskirk (2009) find that
management earnings forecasts increase short-term volatility, but in the
longer run, market uncertainty declines after earnings are announced.
Uncertainty can also affect stock market returns indirectly through
volatility feedback (e.g. Pindyck, 1984; French, Schwert, and Stam-
baugh, 1987; Campbell and Hentschel, 1992). The idea is that volatility-
increasing events increase expected returns, which leads to a decrease
in stock prices. This volatility feedback effect dampens the stock mar-
ket reaction to good news and exacerbates the stock market reaction to
bad news, thus generating asymmetric returns. Bekaert and Wu (2000)
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and Wu (2001) find that covariance asymmetry explains the volatility
feedback effect at the firm level. Given the results in Rogers, Skinner,
and Van Buskirk (2009), it is possible that the results documented in this
paper are driven by a volatility feedback mechanism, whereby increased
volatility around the management earnings forecast increases expected
returns, leading to an asymmetric response to positive versus negative sur-
prises, and that this process is reversed after the earnings announcement
when volatility declines. However, it would still be the case that stock
markets overreact, since the earnings announcements and their associated
decline in volatility are predictable.
3 Results
3.1 Research Design and Data
The primary source of data used in this paper is the company issued
EPS guidance from First Call. I use data on analyst EPS forecasts from
the I/B/E/S unadjusted detail database, data on standardized unexpected
earnings surprises from the I/B/E/S surprise database, and data on real-
ized EPS from the I/B/E/S actual database. Returns, prices, and shares
outstanding are obtained from CRSP and book values are obtained from
Compustat. Finally, the Fama and French (1993) three factors are ob-
tained from Professor Kenneth French’s website.3
Since I examine the immediate reaction to management earnings
3http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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forecasts as well as the subsequent reaction in the 2-month period starting
on the day of the earnings announcement, I retain only the firm’s first
management earnings forecast of the quarter. This allows me to avoid two
potential issues. Firstly, unlike the first management earnings forecast of
the quarter, subsequent management earnings forecasts within a quarter
may contain additional information with regards to the manager’s ability
to correctly predict that quarter’s earnings. Secondly, I avoid counting
firms multiple times, which may introduce noise in the results.
The stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts is ac-
cumulated over the first three days (i.e. over the [0,+2] management
earnings forecast event window). I choose this window because, as noted
before, analyst forecasts in response to management earnings forecasts
affect the stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts. As
such, I include the days around the management earnings forecast which
capture the joint management/analyst effect. Increasing or decreasing the
window size does not change the results qualitatively.
The stock market reaction to the subsequent earnings announcement
is accumulated over the first sixty-one days (i.e. over the [0,+60] earn-
ings announcement event window). This window is often used in the
literature on reactions to earnings announcements and the associated post-
earnings announcement drift (e.g. Ball and Brown, 1968; Foster, Olsen,
and Shevlin, 1984). I do not examine the stock market return between day
3 after the management earnings forecast and day 1 before the earnings
announcement since the length of this time period is highly variable.
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Furthermore, since the earnings announcement is, in most cases, the first
material information released by management since its earnings forecast,
any correction in stock market returns should be observed around this
event.
Standard event-study methodology is used to quantify the stock market
reaction associated with management earnings forecasts and subsequent
earnings announcements. Specifically, I use a Fama and French (1993)
three-factor model to estimate normal returns from 250 to 31 trading
days prior to the management earnings forecast date. The estimated
coefficients from this model are then used to calculate expected returns
during the event window. The abnormal return is the difference between
the realized return and the expected return.
Finally, when examining the impact of analyst forecasts issued in
response to the management earnings forecast, I only categorize analyst
forecasts on the first day subsequent to the management earnings forecast
when analyst forecasts are given, within three days. The drawback to
doing this is that analyst forecasts on later days are omitted, and may also
have an impact stock markets. The advantages to doing this are twofold.
First, it allows me to avoid counting the stock market reaction to the
earnings announcement multiple times. Indeed, a firm with more analysts
would tend to be systematically overrepresented in the sample if all
analyst forecasts were taken instead of the first analyst forecasts. Second,
the first analyst forecasts in response to the management earnings forecast
should be the ones that are the most closely tied to the management
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earnings forecast and therefore have the most impact on stock markets.
3.2 Management Earnings Forecasts
In this section, I examine whether the stock market overreacts to man-
agement earnings forecasts. To do this, I split the sample into three
sub-samples: negative surprise, positive surprise and no surprise and
look at the abnormal returns surrounding the management earnings fore-
cast as well as the abnormal returns following the subsequent earnings
announcement. Figure 1 shows the yearly frequency of management
earnings forecasts as well as the breakdown by negative, positive, and
no surprise sub-samples. The sample begins in 1994 since data on man-
agement earnings guidance is quite sparse before that year, and ends in
2011. From 1994 to 2000, the sample increases gradually, but the bulk
of the observations from this sample become available starting in 2001.
There are fewer observations in 2011 because the sample ends in July of
that year. The impact of the financial crisis is quite clear in this figure as
negative surprises increase until 2007, at which point analyst expectations
plummet, leading to many positive surprises thereafter.
Figure 2 shows the stock market reaction to management earnings
forecasts. Figure 2a looks at the average abnormal return for each day
in the [–10,+10] management earnings forecast event window. A clear
stock market reaction is discernible with an abnormal return of almost
–6% on the day of the forecast for negative surprises and 2% for positive
surprises. The asymmetric reaction is consistent with findings in the
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literature. Figure 2b looks at the average cumulative abnormal return
for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings announcement event window. The
negative surprises, which experienced a large negative abnormal return on
the day of the management earnings forecast, show a positive drift after
the earnings announcement for an average cumulative abnormal return of
almost 2% after two months. Positive surprises show a negative drift of
almost –2%.
I examine the statistical significance of the abnormal returns in table 1.
The results in this table echo what is obvious from figure 2. Negative sur-
prises are associated with a –5.86% cumulative abnormal return around
the management earnings forecast, and a reversal of 1.88% after the
earnings announcement. Positive surprises are associated with a 1.93%
cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast,
and a reversal of –1.72% after the earnings announcement. These abnor-
mal returns are all statistically significant at the 1% level. No surprises
show a pattern that is similar to that of positive surprises, but with a lower
magnitude.
The robustness of the prior results is assessed in a multivariate regres-
sion framework. Table 2 presents OLS regressions of the cumulative
abnormal returns on control variables as well as firm and year fixed
effects. Specifically, I add the mean analyst forecast and management
earnings forecast to control for the level of expected earnings from both
the analysts’ and managers’ point of view, respectively. I also control for
the size of the firm and amount of coverage it receives using the number
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of analysts following the firm in the past year. Finally, I control earn-
ings uncertainty using book-to-market, prior standardized unexpected
earnings, and the size of the management earnings forecast range.4 The
t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity consistent standard
errors. Model 1 in columns 1 and 2 confirm the results from figure 2 and
table 1. In particular, management earnings forecasts that are associated
with negative surprises have a cumulative abnormal return of –6.23% and
a reversal after the earnings announcement of 3.90%. Management earn-
ings forecasts that are associated with positive surprises have a cumulative
abnormal return of 3.05% and a reversal after the earnings announcement
of –2.09%. I also test if the cumulative abnormal returns around the
management earnings forecasts affect the cumulative abnormal returns
after the earnings announcement directly in column 3 (Model 2). This
would provide evidence not only of semi-strong form market inefficiency,
but also weak form market inefficiency. Indeed, a management earnings
forecast cumulative abnormal return increase of 1% is associated with a
subsequent correction of –0.39%, everything else being equal.
3.3 Regulation Fair Disclosure
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD) was approved by the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission on August 10, 2000. Reg-FD is intended to
level the playing field by reducing information disparities between indi-
vidual and institutional market participants (Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong,
4The size of the management forecast range is set to zero for point estimates.
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2003). Reg-FD prohibits selective disclosure of material information and
requires broad, non-exclusionary disclosure of such information. I sepa-
rate the sample into two sub-periods covering the years before and after
Reg-FD in order to see what impact this regulation has had, if any, on the
stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts. Figure 3 shows
the stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts for each
sub-period. Figures 3a and 3c look at the average abnormal return for
each day in the [–10,+10] management earnings forecast event window,
before and after Reg-FD, respectively. The stock market reaction before
Reg-FD is about –10% on the day of the forecast for negative surprises
and 5% for positive surprises. This is more than twice the size of the
stock market reaction after Reg-FD, which is about –4% for negative
surprises and 2% for positive surprises. Figures 3b and 3d look at the
average cumulative abnormal return for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings
announcement event window, before and after the passing of Reg-FD,
respectively. Before Reg-FD, the negative surprises that are associated
with a large negative abnormal return on the day of the management
earnings forecast show a positive drift after the earnings announcement
for an average cumulative abnormal return of about 5% after two months.
After Reg-FD, this correction is just over 1%. Positive surprises show
a negative drift of almost –10% before Reg-FD, and a negative drift of
about –1.5% after.
Table 3 reports the statistical significance of the abnormal returns.
Before Reg-FD, negative surprises are associated with a –12.42% cumu-
15
lative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast, and
a reversal of 6.45% after the earnings announcement. After Reg-FD,
negative surprises are associated with a –4.68% cumulative abnormal
return around the management earnings forecast, and a reversal of 1.06%
after the earnings announcement. Before Reg-FD, positive surprises are
associated with a 5.96% cumulative abnormal return around the man-
agement earnings forecast, and a reversal of –6.41% after the earnings
announcement. After Reg-FD, positive surprises are associated with
a 1.86% cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings
forecast, and a reversal of –1.65% after the earnings announcement. No
surprises show no overreaction before Reg-FD. After Reg-FD,no sur-
prises show a pattern that is similar to that of positive surprises, but with
a lower magnitude.
The robustness of the sub-period results is assessed in a multivariate
regression framework. Table 4 presents OLS regressions of the cumula-
tive abnormal returns on the control variables described above as well
as firm and year fixed effects. The t-statistics are calculated using het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors. The first three columns report
results for the period before Reg-FD, while the last three columns report
the results for the period after Reg-FD. Model 1 in columns 1 and 2
indicate that before Reg-FD, overreaction was mainly driven by nega-
tive surprises. Management earnings forecasts that are associated with
negative surprises have a cumulative abnormal return of –10.53% and a re-
versal after the earnings announcement of 7.50%. Management earnings
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forecasts that are associated with positive surprises have a cumulative
abnormal return of 6.03%, but no reliable reversal after the earnings
announcement. I also test if the cumulative abnormal returns around the
management earnings forecasts affect the cumulative abnormal returns
after the earnings announcement directly in column 3 (Model 2). A
management earnings forecast cumulative abnormal return increase of
1% is associated with a subsequent correction of –0.20%. Model 1 in
columns 4 and 5 indicate that after Reg-FD, overreaction occurs for both
negative and positive surprises. Management earnings forecasts that are
associated with negative surprises have a cumulative abnormal return
of –5.88% and a reversal after the earnings announcement of 3.50%.
Management earnings forecasts that are associated with positive surprises
have a cumulative abnormal return of 2.96%, and a reversal after the
earnings announcement of –1.91%. I also test if the cumulative abnormal
returns around the management earnings forecasts affect the cumulative
abnormal returns after the earnings announcement directly in column 3
(Model 6). A management earnings forecast cumulative abnormal return
increase of 1% is associated with a subsequent correction of –0.41%.
The results in this subsection show that while the level of stock market
overreaction was greater before Reg-FD, the marginal impact is greater
after Reg-FD. Moreover, overreaction after Reg-FD is more balanced,
in the sense that it occurs not only for negative surprises, but also for
positive surprises.
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3.4 Management Forecast Characteristics
Management has discretion over certain aspects of the earnings forecasts
they make. In particular, management can decide whether to issue a
point forecast (i.e. one estimate) or a range forecast (i.e. a low and high
estimate). In the literature, this is known as the forecast form. They can
also decide whether to supply forecasts to market participants repeatedly
or sporadically, and whether to provide a forecast early in the quarter
or late in the quarter. The former is referred to as forecast frequency,
while the latter is referred to as forecast timing. The impact of these
forecast characteristics on stock market overreaction is examined in this
subsection. The statistical significance of the abnormal returns by forecast
form, frequency and timing is investigated in table 5. For range (point)
forecasts, negative surprises are associated with a –5.66% (–7.06%) cu-
mulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast, and a
reversal of 1.71% (2.94%) after the earnings announcement. The positive
surprises of range (point) forecasts are associated with a 1.89% (2.21%)
cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast,
and a reversal of –1.46% (–3.74%) after the earnings announcement.
For sporadic (repeat) forecasts, negative surprises are associated with a
–8.10% (–4.18%) cumulative abnormal return around the management
earnings forecast, and a reversal of 2.53% (1.40%) after the earnings
announcement. The positive surprises of sporadic (repeat) forecasts are
associated with a 2.52% (1.76%) cumulative abnormal return around the
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management earnings forecast, and a reversal of –2.00% (–1.64%) after
the earnings announcement. Finally, for short (long) horizon forecasts,
negative surprises are associated with a –7.15% (–3.88%) cumulative ab-
normal return around the management earnings forecast, and a reversal of
2.03% (1.65%) after the earnings announcement. The positive surprises
of short (long) horizon forecasts are associated with a 2.06% (1.80%)
cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast,
and a reversal of –1.83% (–1.61%) after the earnings announcement.
I examine the robustness of the prior results in a multivariate regres-
sion framework. Table 6 presents OLS regressions of the marginal impact
of the cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings fore-
cast on the cumulative abnormal return after the earnings announcement
and on control variables as well as firm and year fixed effects, for each
subsample separately. The control variables are the same as those used
in table 2 and 4 regressions. The t-statistics are calculated using het-
eroskedasticity consistent standard errors. Interestingly, the marginal
impact of the stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts is
fairly constant across subsamples. In particular, a management earnings
forecast cumulative abnormal return increase of 1% is associated with a
subsequent correction of between –0.38% and –0.44%, depending on the
subsample.
The results in this subsection confirm that forecast characteristics do
not qualitatively affect the abnormal return pattern documented in the
previous subsections. However, management earnings point forecasts,
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sporadic forecasts and short horizon forecasts are all associated with more
stock market overreaction than range forecasts, repeat forecasts and long
horizon forecasts, respectively. Even though the level of stock market
reaction is different in different subsamples, the marginal impact of the
market’s initial reaction to management’s forecast barely changes.
3.5 Firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics may also impact the stock market overreaction. For
example, small firms, growth firms and firm with low analyst coverage
are all associated with greater uncertainty, and may therefore illicit a
greater stock market reaction as a result. While I control for these firm
characteristics in the table 2 and 4 regressions, the level of overreaction
may nevertheless be different in subsamples based on these characteristics.
The impact of firm characteristics on stock market overreaction is reported
in this subsection. The statistical significance of the abnormal returns
by firm size, book-to-market and analyst coverage is shown in table 7.
For small (large) firms, negative surprises are associated with a –6.71%
(–4.66%) cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings
forecast, and a reversal of 2.54% (0.96%) after the earnings announce-
ment. The positive surprises of small (large) firms are associated with
a 2.78% (1.22%) cumulative abnormal return around the management
earnings forecast, and a reversal of –1.16% (–2.18%) after the earnings
announcement. For growth firms, negative surprises are not associated
with any overreaction, but positive surprises are associated with a 2.01%
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cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast,
and a reversal of –4.01% after the earnings announcement. The reverse
is true of value firms. That is, positive surprises are not associated with
any overreaction, but negative surprises are associated with a –5.22%
cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast,
and a reversal of 3.48% after the earnings announcement. Finally, for
low (high) analyst coverage firms, negative surprises are associated with
a –6.38% (–5.18%) cumulative abnormal return around the management
earnings forecast, and a reversal of 1.81% (2.05%) after the earnings an-
nouncement. The positive surprises of low (high) analyst coverage firms
are associated with a 2.60% (1.41%) cumulative abnormal return around
the management earnings forecast, and a reversal of –2.39% (–1.17%)
after the earnings announcement.
The prior results are reexamined in a multivariate regression frame-
work. Table 8 presents OLS regressions of the marginal impact of the
cumulative abnormal return around the management earnings forecast on
the cumulative abnormal return after the earnings announcement and on
control variables as well as firm and year fixed effects, for each subsample
separately. The control variables are the same as those used in table 2, 4
and 6 regressions. The t-statistics are calculated using heteroskedasticity
consistent standard errors. Again, the marginal impact of the stock mar-
ket reaction to management earnings forecasts is fairly constant across
subsamples. Specifically, a management earnings forecast cumulative
abnormal return increase of 1% is associated with a subsequent correction
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of between –0.40% and –0.43% depending on the subsample.
The results in this subsection show that small firms and low coverage
firms are associated with more stock market overreaction than large firms
and firms with high analyst coverage, respectively. The level of stock
market reaction is different in different subsamples, but the marginal
impact of the initial market reaction to management forecasts does not
change materially. One notable finding in this subsection is that the stock
market does not overreact to growth firms that announce bad news or
to value firms that announce good news. If book-to-market captures
recent winners (low B/M) and losers (high B/M), it may be that the stock
market overreaction I document is related to the short-run continuation
and long-run return reversal patters found in the literature.5
3.6 Relative Analyst Forecasts
In this subsection, I examine whether the analyst forecasts given in re-
sponse to the management earnings forecast impact the stock market
reaction. Figures 4a and 4b show the distribution of relative analyst
forecasts for range and point forecasts, respectively. The relative analyst
forecast measure for range forecasts is the analyst forecast minus the
midpoint of the management earnings forecast range, divided by the size
of the forecast range. Analyst forecasts exactly equal to the management
earnings forecast range low, mid and high points have a value of –0.5,
5Overreaction followed by undercorrection would lead to positive autocorrelation in the short-run, while
subsequent overreaction followed by overcorrection would lead to negative autocorrelation in the long-run.
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0 and 0.5, respectively. A striking feature of this figure is that analysts
predominantly issue forecasts equal to the management forecast range
low, mid and high points. In fact, 85% of analyst forecasts are on the
reference points for management earnings range forecasts. The relative
analyst forecast measure for point forecasts is the analyst forecast minus
the management earnings point forecast, divided by the the management
earnings point forecast. Analyst forecasts exactly equal to the manage-
ment earnings point forecast have a value of 0. This figure shows that the
distribution of analyst forecasts for management earnings point forecasts
is much less dispersed than for range forecasts. Nevertheless, analysts
predominantly issue forecasts equal to the management point forecast.
Indeed, 35% of analyst forecasts are exactly equal to the management
earnings point forecast.
Given the above description of the analyst forecast distribution around
management earnings forecasts, I create categorical variables to classify
analyst forecasts relative to management forecasts as follows. For man-
agement earnings range forecasts, analyst forecasts are either above the
range high point (optimistic), at the range high point (cautiously opti-
mistic), between the range high and low points (neutral), at the range low
point (cautiously pessimistic), or below the range low point (pessimistic).
For management earnings point forecasts, the number categories is re-
duced to three (optimistic, neutral, or pessimistic). I then aggregate at the
management forecast level. For management earnings range forecasts, an-
alysts are considered optimistic, cautiously optimistic, neutral, cautiously
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pessimistic, or pessimistic if all analysts on that day were in the same
category. Otherwise, analyst forecasts are considered to be “mixed”. The
same methodology is used with management earnings point forecasts.
Figure 5 shows how relative analyst forecast impact stock market over-
reaction for range forecasts. As one might expect when there is a negative
surprise, all categories of relative analyst forecasts experience negative
stock market reactions. However, cautiously pessimistic analyst forecasts
experience much more negative reactions than the other four categories,
with an abnormal return of about –8%. After the earnings announcement,
cautiously pessimistic analyst forecasts also experience a more positive
drift than the other four categories, with a correction of almost 4%. For
positive surprises, all categories of relative analyst forecasts experience
positive stock market reactions. There is little to distinguish the five
categories, although cautiously pessimistic, neutral, and cautiously opti-
mistic forecasts have slightly more positive reactions. However, after the
earnings announcement, pessimistic, cautiously pessimistic and neutral
analyst forecasts experience very little downward drift, while cautiously
optimistic and optimistic analyst forecasts experience a more negative
drift, with a correction of about –4%. Figure 6 shows how relative analyst
forecast impact stock market overreaction for point forecasts. In terms
of the stock market reaction to management earnings forecasts, neutral
analyst forecasts appear to have the largest impact for both negative and
positive surprises, although pessimistic and optimistic analyst forecasts
also have strong stock market reactions. However, the subsequent stock
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market correction shows a similar pattern for all three categories (i.e.
positive corrections for negative surprises and negative corrections for
positive surprises). Therefore, although the three categories mimic the
trend for the overall sample of management earnings point forecasts, the
difference between them is slight.
The statistical significance of the abnormal returns by relative analyst
forecast category is investigated in tables 9 and 10 for range and point
forecasts, respectively. The results in table 9 are similar to those in fig-
ure 5. For negative management forecast surprises, cautiously pessimistic
and neutral analyst forecasts experience stock market overreaction, while
the other three categories do not. Cautiously pessimistic (neutral) fore-
casts are associated with management earnings forecast abnormal returns
of –10.08% (–5.42%), and subsequent earnings announcement drift of
4.38% (1.66%). For positive management forecast surprises, neutral and
cautiously optimistic analyst forecasts experience stock market overre-
action, while the other three categories do not. Cautiously optimistic
(neutral) forecasts are associated with management earnings forecast
abnormal returns of 1.96% (2.03%), and subsequent earnings announce-
ment drift of –2.68% (–1.68%). For point forecasts, the results in table 10
are more telling than those in figure 6. For negative surprises, neutral
analyst forecasts are the only forecasts to experience overreaction, with
an abnormal return of –8.93% and a subsequent correction of 3.26%.
For positive surprises, neutral and optimistic analyst forecasts experi-
ence overreaction, with an abnormal returns of 3.32% and 2.16%, and
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subsequent corrections of –4.82% and –6.88%, respectively.
The evidence in this subsection shows that the stock market over-
reaction found in this paper is present mainly when analyst forecasts
corroborate management forecasts. Overreaction is also present when
there are mixed forecasts, suggesting that analyst disagreement is insuffi-
cient to eliminate this anomaly. What is required to eliminate overreaction
is a clear analyst signal that is clear to investors, but different from man-
agement’s signal.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines whether the stock market overreacts to management
earnings forecasts. I find that this is in fact the case for both positive and
negative surprises, but more so for negative surprises. This overreaction
still persists after the introduction of Regulation Fair Disclosure, although
the level of the overreaction has decreased since this legislation was intro-
duced. The level of stock market overreaction to management earnings
forecasts changes depending on the forecast form, frequency and timing
of management earnings forecasts, as well as the size, growth prospect
and analyst coverage of the firm. However, the reaction to management
earnings forecasts has almost the same marginal impact on the subse-
quent reaction to earnings announcement, regardless of the forecast or
firm characteristic examined. I also investigate whether analyst forecasts
in immediate response to management earnings forecasts affect the stock
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market reaction. Return reversals appear strongest in situations when
analysts provide confirmatory forecasts in response to the management
earnings forecast. This evidence is consistent with the idea that in situa-
tion of increased uncertainty, behavioral biases may cause investors to
overweight their recent investment experience, leading to stock market
overreaction.
This paper has implications in terms of information dissemination
and its impact on market efficiency. The results show that the imple-
mentation of Regulation Fair Disclosure has helped to reduce the level
of stock market overreaction to management forecasts, suggesting that
a even playing field does improve informational efficiency. Through
their forecasts, analysts appear to have the power to reduce stock market
reaction even further. For the most part however, analysts provide incre-
mentally uninformative forecasts in the sense that their forecasts are not
well differentiated from those of management.
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Figure 1: Yearly Frequency of Management Forecasts by Forecast Surprise
This figure reports the yearly frequency of management forecasts by the type of surprise which the forecast
represents. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is below the current analyst
forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst
forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is above the current
analyst forecast consensus.
34
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Event-Time (days)
-4
-2
0
2
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
)
Positive SurpriseNo SurpriseNegative Surprise
(a) Mgmt Forecast
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Event-Time (days)
-2
-1
0
1
2
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
A
bn
or
m
al
 R
et
ur
n 
(%
)
Positive SurpriseNo SurpriseNegative Surprise
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Figure 2: Management Forecast Average Abnormal Returns
This figure reports the average abnormal return for the [-10,+10] management forecast window (Mgmt
Forecast) and average cumulative abnormal returns for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings announcement
window (EPS Announcement) for various subsamples. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the
management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Abnormal return is calculated
using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return.
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Figure 3: Management Forecast Average Abnormal Returns by Subperiod
This figure reports the average abnormal return for the [-10,+10] management forecast window (Mgmt
Forecast) and average cumulative abnormal returns for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings announcement
window (EPS Announcement) for various subsamples. Before Reg-FD refers to the calendar period up until
the year 2000, while After Reg-FD refers to the calendar period after the year 2000. A Negative Surprise
occurs when the management forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise
occurs when the management forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive
Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus.
Abnormal return is calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Analyst Forecasts Relative to Management Forecasts
This figure reports the percentage frequency distribution of analyst forecasts relative to the management
forecast. The relative measure for range forecasts in figure (a) is the Analyst Forecast minus the management
forecast range midpoint, divided by the management forecast range high point minus the low point. The
relative measure for point forecasts in figure (b) is the Analyst Forecast minus the management forecast,
divided by the management forecast. Analyst Forecast is the analyst quarterly EPS forecast.
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Figure 5: Management Range Forecast Average Abnormal Returns by Relative
Analyst Forecast
This figure reports the average abnormal return for the [-10,+10] management forecast window (Mgmt
Forecast) and average cumulative abnormal returns for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings announcement
window (EPS Announcement) for various subsamples. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the
management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Pessimistic is day on which all
analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are less than the management forecast low point. Cautiously Pessimistic
is a day on which all analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are equal to the management forecast low point.
Neutral is a day on which all analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are between the management forecast low
and high points. Cautiously Optimistic is a day on which all analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are equal to
the management forecast high point. Optimistic is a day on which all analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are
greater than the management forecast high point. Abnormal return is calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor
model to estimate the expected return. 38
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Figure 6: Management Point Forecast Average Abnormal Returns by Relative
Analyst Forecast
This figure reports the average abnormal return for the [-10,+10] management forecast window (Mgmt
Forecast) and average cumulative abnormal returns for the subsequent [0,+60] earnings announcement
window (EPS Announcement) for various subsamples. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the
management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Pessimistic is day on which
all analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are less than the management forecast. Neutral is a day on which all
analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are equal to the management forecast. Optimistic is a day on which all
analyst forecasts of quarterly EPS are greater than the management forecast. Abnormal return is calculated
using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return.
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Table 1: Management Forecast Abnormal Returns
This table reports the management forecast average 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (Mgmt Forecast
CAR) and subsequent earnings announcemet average 61-day cumulative abnormal returns (Earnings CAR),
in percentage on various subsamples. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is
below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is
equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the management forecast
estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Abnormal return is calculated using a Fama-French
3-factor model to estimate the expected return. The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics. ***, ** or
* signify that the test statistic is significant at the 1, 5 or 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
Negative Surprise Positive Surprise No Surprise
Mgmt Forecast CAR −5.86∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
t-stat (−41.24) (17.02) (6.29)
Earnings CAR 1.88∗∗∗ −1.72∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗
t-stat (6.26) (−6.39) (−6.22)
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Table 2: Management Forecast Abnormal Return Multivariate Regressions
This table reports the coefficients from a regression of management forecast 3-day cumulative abnormal
returns (Mgmt Forecast CAR) and subsequent earnings announcemement 61-day cumulative abnormal
returns (Earnings CAR) on multiple variables. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management forecast
estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the management
forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Mean Analyst Forecast is the average
analyst quarterly EPS forecast on the event day. Mgmt Forecast is the forecast point or middle point of the
management quarterly EPS forecast range. Range is the difference between the Mgmt Forecast high and
low points, divided by the stock price at the end of the prior month. Market Cap is the number of shares
outstanding multiplied by the price, in millions of dollars. Book-to-Market is the book value of common
equity divided by the market capitalization. Analyst Coverage is the number of analysts that have provided
an EPS forecast for the firm over the past year. SUE is the ratio of the quarterly earnings surprise to the
standard deviation of earnings surprises over the past four quarters. Abnormal return is calculated using a
Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return. The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics based
on heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors. ***, ** or * signify that the test statistic is significant at the
1, 5 or 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
Mgmt Forecast CAR Earnings CAR
Model 1 Model 1 Model 2
Mgmt Forecast CAR −0.39∗∗∗
(−23.50)
Negative Surprise −6.23∗∗∗ 3.90∗∗∗
(−32.10) (8.64)
Positive Surprise 3.05∗∗∗ −2.09∗∗∗
(13.40) (−3.94)
Mean Analyst Forecast 3.07∗∗∗ −1.22 −0.22
(4.07) (−0.70) (−0.13)
Mgmt Forecast −0.98 2.51 1.79
(−1.38) (1.52) (1.09)
Range 0.18 2.77∗∗∗ 2.94∗∗∗
(0.72) (4.75) (5.11)
Ln(Market Cap) −3.89∗∗∗ −13.75∗∗∗ −15.26∗∗∗
(−19.00) (−28.88) (−32.15)
Book-to-Market −0.02 −0.02 −0.02
(−0.76) (−0.23) (−0.31)
Analyst Coverage 0.07∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗
(3.13) (8.94) (9.86)
SUE 0.07∗∗∗ −0.07∗∗∗ −0.04∗∗∗
(10.47) (−4.36) (−2.81)
Intercept 44.24∗∗∗ 159.41∗∗∗ 176.59∗∗∗
(11.32) (17.53) (19.59)
Adj. R2 (%) 21.1 12.7 14.8
N 19,869 19,868 19,868
Firm Fixed Effects Y Y Y
Year Fixed Effects Y Y Y
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Table 3: Management Forecast Abnormal Returns by Subperiod
This table reports the management forecast average 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (Mgmt Forecast
CAR) and subsequent earnings announcemet average 61-day cumulative abnormal returns (Earnings CAR),
in percentage on various subsamples. Before Reg-FD refers to the calendar period up until the year 2000,
while After Reg-FD refers to the calendar period after the year 2000. A Negative Surprise occurs when the
management forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the
management forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs
when the management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Abnormal return is
calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return. The numbers in parentheses
are simple t-statistics. ***, ** or * signify that the test statistic is significant at the 1, 5 or 10% two-tailed
level, respectively.
Negative Surprise Positive Surprise No Surprise
Panel A: Before Reg-FD
Mgmt Forecast CAR −12.42∗∗∗ 5.96∗∗∗ −0.84∗
t-stat (−25.59) (4.95) (−1.72)
Earnings CAR 6.45∗∗∗ −6.41∗∗ −1.86
t-stat (6.50) (−2.09) (−1.58)
Panel B: After Reg-FD
Mgmt Forecast CAR −4.68∗∗∗ 1.86∗∗∗ 0.75∗∗∗
t-stat (−34.06) (16.46) (7.19)
Earnings CAR 1.06∗∗∗ −1.65∗∗∗ −1.59∗∗∗
t-stat (3.48) (−6.12) (−6.02)
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Table 5: Management Forecast Abnormal Returns by Forecast Characteristic
This table reports the management forecast average 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (Mgmt Forecast
CAR) and subsequent earnings announcemet average 61-day cumulative abnormal returns (Earnings CAR),
in percentage on various subsamples. For Repeat Forecasts, management has provided at least three other
forecasts in the past four quarters. Otherwise, forecasts are Sporatic Forecasts. A Short Horizon forecast is
a forecast given within 60 days of the fiscal period end date. Otherwise, the forecast has a Long Horizon.
A Negative Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast
consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast
consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is above the current analyst
forecast consensus. Abnormal return is calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the
expected return. The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics. ***, ** or * signify that the test statistic
is significant at the 1, 5 or 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
Negative Surprise Positive Surprise No Surprise
Panel A: Range Forecasts
Mgmt Forecast CAR −5.66∗∗∗ 1.89∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗
t-stat (−37.41) (15.74) (6.73)
Earnings CAR 1.71∗∗∗ −1.46∗∗∗ −1.14∗∗∗
t-stat (5.33) (−5.13) (−3.98)
Panel B: Point Forecasts
Mgmt Forecast CAR −7.06∗∗∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 0.16
t-stat (−17.45) (6.52) (0.70)
Earnings CAR 2.94∗∗∗ −3.74∗∗∗ −3.32∗∗∗
t-stat (3.43) (−4.47) (−5.67)
Panel C: Sporatic Forecasts
Mgmt Forecast CAR −8.10∗∗∗ 2.52∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗
t-stat (−32.01) (9.41) (2.31)
Earnings CAR 2.53∗∗∗ −2.00∗∗∗ −2.53∗∗∗
t-stat (4.82) (−2.91) (−4.88)
Panel D: Repeat Forecasts
Mgmt Forecast CAR −4.18∗∗∗ 1.76∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
t-stat (−26.93) (14.21) (6.28)
Earnings CAR 1.40∗∗∗ −1.64∗∗∗ −1.19∗∗∗
t-stat (4.00) (−5.74) (−4.06)
Panel E: Short Horizon
Mgmt Forecast CAR −7.15∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗∗ 0.15
t-stat (−36.86) (12.44) (0.99)
Earnings CAR 2.03∗∗∗ −1.83∗∗∗ −0.99∗∗
t-stat (5.01) (−4.50) (−2.57)
Panel F: Long Horizon
Mgmt Forecast CAR −3.88∗∗∗ 1.80∗∗∗ 1.06∗∗∗
t-stat (−19.73) (11.65) (7.84)
Earnings CAR 1.65∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗∗ −2.13∗∗∗
t-stat (3.75) (−4.53) (−6.13)
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Table 7: Management Forecast Abnormal Returns by Firm Characteristic
This table reports the management forecast average 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (Mgmt Forecast
CAR) and subsequent earnings announcemet average 61-day cumulative abnormal returns (Earnings CAR), in
percentage on various subsamples. Firm characteristic subsamples are created by splitting the sample into two
by the median. Market Cap is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by the price, in millions of dollars.
Book-to-Market is the book value of common equity divided by the market capitalization. Analyst Coverage
is the number of analysts that have provided an EPS forecast for the firm over the past year. A Negative
Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is below the current analyst forecast consensus. No
Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is equal to the current analyst forecast consensus.
A Positive Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is above the current analyst forecast
consensus. Abnormal return is calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return.
The numbers in parentheses are simple t-statistics. ***, ** or * signify that the test statistic is significant at
the 1, 5 or 10% two-tailed level, respectively.
Negative Surprise Positive Surprise No Surprise
Panel A: Small Firms
Mgmt Forecast CAR −6.71∗∗∗ 2.78∗∗∗ 0.51∗∗∗
t-stat (−32.56) (14.13) (2.78)
Earnings CAR 2.54∗∗∗ −1.16∗∗ −1.20∗∗∗
t-stat (5.73) (−2.43) (−2.66)
Panel B: Large Firms
Mgmt Forecast CAR −4.66∗∗∗ 1.22∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗
t-stat (−26.09) (9.64) (7.30)
Earnings CAR 0.96∗∗∗ −2.18∗∗∗ −1.97∗∗∗
t-stat (2.61) (−7.35) (−7.21)
Panel C: Growth Firms
Mgmt Forecast CAR −6.66∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗
t-stat (−29.22) (12.35) (2.37)
Earnings CAR 0.05 −4.01∗∗∗ −3.41∗∗∗
t-stat (0.12) (−10.65) (−10.50)
Panel D: Value Firms
Mgmt Forecast CAR −5.22∗∗∗ 1.85∗∗∗ 1.07∗∗∗
t-stat (−28.72) (11.65) (6.39)
Earnings CAR 3.48∗∗∗ 0.26 0.70
t-stat (8.16) (0.67) (1.64)
Panel E: Low Coverage
Mgmt Forecast CAR −6.38∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗
t-stat (−32.03) (14.31) (4.09)
Earnings CAR 1.81∗∗∗ −2.39∗∗∗ −1.92∗∗∗
t-stat (4.21) (−5.44) (−4.65)
Panel F: High Coverage
Mgmt Forecast CAR −5.18∗∗∗ 1.41∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
t-stat (−25.81) (9.80) (4.92)
Earnings CAR 2.05∗∗∗ −1.17∗∗∗ −1.37∗∗∗
t-stat (4.97) (−3.49) (−4.22)
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Table 10: Management Point Forecast Abnormal Returns by Relative Analyst
Forecast
This table reports the management forecast average 3-day cumulative abnormal returns (Mgmt Forecast CAR)
and subsequent earnings announcement average 61-day cumulative abnormal returns (Earnings CAR), in
percentage on various subsamples. A Negative Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is
below the current analyst forecast consensus. No Surprise occurs when the management forecast estimate is
equal to the current analyst forecast consensus. A Positive Surprise occurs when the management forecast
estimate is above the current analyst forecast consensus. Pessimistic is day on which all analyst forecasts
of quarterly EPS are less than the management forecast. Neutral is a day on which all analyst forecasts of
quarterly EPS are equal to the management forecast. Optimistic is a day on which all analyst forecasts of
quarterly EPS are greater than the management forecast. Mixed is a day on which there are analyst forecasts
of quarterly EPS from more than one category relative to the management forecast. Abnormal return is
calculated using a Fama-French 3-factor model to estimate the expected return. The numbers in parentheses
are simple t-statistics. ***, ** or * signify that the test statistic is significant at the 1, 5 or 10% two-tailed
level, respectively.
Pessimistic Neutral Optimistic Mixed
Panel A: Negative Surprise
Mgmt Forecast CAR −8.86∗∗∗ −8.93∗∗∗ −4.80∗∗∗ −6.00∗∗∗
t-stat (−5.68) (−12.14) (−6.65) (−9.71)
Earnings CAR 6.28 3.26∗∗ 1.56 2.71∗∗
t-stat (1.28) (2.35) (0.73) (2.11)
Panel B: Positive Surprise
Mgmt Forecast CAR 1.92∗ 3.32∗∗∗ 2.16∗∗∗ 1.66∗∗∗
t-stat (1.83) (4.59) (2.65) (3.70)
Earnings CAR −1.24 −4.82∗∗∗ −6.88∗∗∗ −2.92∗∗∗
t-stat (−0.33) (−3.09) (−2.80) (−2.62)
Panel C: No Surprise
Mgmt Forecast CAR −1.03 −0.50 0.59 0.89∗∗∗
t-stat (−1.44) (−1.29) (1.06) (2.65)
Earnings CAR −0.21 −5.13∗∗∗ −3.92∗∗ −2.17∗∗
t-stat (−0.13) (−5.08) (−2.46) (−2.39)
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